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Time and Free Will An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness

Time and Free Will - Bergson, Henri - Régikönyvek
Time and Free Will - Régikönyvek Time and Free Will - Régikönyvek Time and Free Will - Régikönyvek
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Internationally known and one of the most influential philosophers of his day (and for a time almost a cult figure in France, where his lectures drew huge crowds), Henri Bergson (1859-41) led a revolution in philosophical thought by rejecting traditional conceptual and abstract methods, and arguing that the intuition is deeper than the intellect. His speculations, especially about the nature of time, had a profound influence on many other philosophers, as well as on poets and novelists; they are said to have been the seed for À la recherce de temps perdu by Marcel Proust (whose cousin was Bergson's wife). Though his ideas were sometimes difficult to follow, Bergson was also a fine stylist, who once declared, "there is nothing in philosophy which could not be said in everyday language," and who was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1927. In Time and Free Will, written as his doctoral thesis, Bergson tries to dispel the arguments against free will. These arguments, he shows, come from a confusion of different ideas of time. Physicists and mathematicians conceive of time as a measurable construct much like the spatial dimensions. But in human experience, life is perceived as a continuous and unmeasurable flow rather than as a succession of marked-off states of consciousness — something that can be measured not quantitatively, but only qualitatively. And because human personalities express themselves in acts that cannot be predicted, Bergson declares free will to be an observable fact. Students and teachers of philosophy are sure to welcome this inexpensive reprint of Bergson's classic, influential essay, long a staple of college philosophy courses.

Harper & Row Publishers
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New York
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ragasztott papír
Szélesség: 14.00cm, Magasság: 21.00cm
Quantitative differences applicable to magnitudes but not
to intensities, 1-4 ; Attempt to estimate intensities by
objective causes or atomic movements, 4-7 ; Different
kinds of intensities, 7 ; Deep-seated psychic states :
desire, 8, hope, 9, joy and sorrow, 10 ; Aesthetic feelings,
11-18 : grace, 12, beauty, 14-18, music, poetry, art,
15-18 ; Moral feelings, pity, 19 ; Conscious states involv-
ing physical symptoms, 20: muscular effort, 21-26,
attention and muscular tension, 27-28 ; Violent emotions,
29-31 : rage, 29; fear, 3o ; Affective sensations, 32-39
pleasure and pain, 33-39, disgust, 36 ; Representative
sensations, 39-6o : and external causes, 42, sensation of
sound, 43, intensity, pitch and muscular effort, 45-6,
sensations of heat and cold, 46-7, sensations of pressure
and weight, 47-50, sensation of light, 50-60, photometric
experiments, 52-60, Delbceuf 's experiments, 56-60 ;
Psychophysics, 60-72: Weber and Fechner, 61-65,
Delbceuf, 67-70, the mistake of regarding sensations as
magnitudes, 70-72 ; Intensity in (i) representative, (2)
affective states, intensity and multiplicity, 72-74.
ÉP. 1-74
Number and its units, 75-77, number and accompanying
intuition of space, 78-85 ; Two kinds of multiplicity, of


material objects and conscious states, 85-87, impene- implies associationist conception of mind, 155-158, this
trability of matter, 88-8g, homogeneous time and pure involves defective conception of self, 159-163 ; The free
duration, 9o-91 ; Space and its contents, 92, empirical act : freedom as expressing the fundamental self, 165-
theories of space, 93-94, intuition of empty homogeneous 170 ; Real duration and contingency, 172-182 could
medium peculiar to man, 95-97• time as homogeneous our act have been different ? 172-175, geometrical repre-
medium reducible to space, 98-99 ; Duration, succession sentation of process of coming to a decision, 175-178,
and space, 100-104, pure duration, 105-106 ; Is duration the fallacies to which it leads determinists and libertarians,
measurable ? 107-110 ; Is motion measurable ? III- 179-183 ; Real duration and prediction, x83-198: con-
I I2 ; Paradox of the Eleatics, 113-115 ; Duration and ditions of Paul's prediction of Peter's action (1) being
simultaneity, 115-116 ; Velocity and simultaneity, I17- Peter (2) knowing already his final act, 184-189, the three
I19 ; Space alone homogeneous, duration and succes- fallacies involved, 190-192, astronomical prediction de-
sion belong to conscious mind, I2o-I2I ; Two kinds of pends on hypothetical acceleration of movements, 193-
multiplicity, qualitative and quantitative, 121-123, super- 19J, duration cannot be thus accelerated, 196-198 ;
ficial psychic states invested with discontinuity of their Real duration and causality, 199-221: the law " same
external causes, 124-126, these eliminated, real duration antecedents, same consequents," 199-201, causality as
is felt as a quality, 127-128 ; The two aspects of the self, regular succession, 202-203, causality as prefiguring : two
on the surface well-defined conscious states, deeper down kinds (1) prefiguring as mathematical pre-existence ;
states which interpenetrate and form organic whole, implies non-duration, but we endure and therefore may be
129-139, solidifying influence of language on sensation, free, 204-210, (2) prefiguring as having idea of future act
129-132, analysis distorts the feelings, 132-134, deeper to be realized by effort ; does not involve determinism, 211-
conscious states forming a part of ourselves, 134-136 ; 214, determinism results from confusing these two senses,
Problems soluble only by recourse to the concrete and 215-218 ; Freedom real but indefinable, 219-221.
living self, 137-139. pp. 140-221

PP• 75-139


THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSCIOUS STATES States of self perceived througl•forms borrowed from external
FREE WILL world, 223 ; Intensity as quality, 225 ; Duration as

Dynamism and mechanism, 140-142 ; Two kinds of deter- qualitative multiplicity, 226 ; No duration in the external
minism, 142 ; Physical determinism, 143-155 : and world, 227 ; Extensity and duration must be separated,
molecular theory of matter, 143, and conservation of 229 ; Only the fundamental self free, 231 ; Kant's mis-
energy, 144, if conservation universal, physiological and taken idea of time as homogeneous, 232, hence he put the
nervous phenomena necessitated, but perhaps not con- self which is free outside both space and time, 233 ; Dura-
scious states, 145-148, but is principle of conversation tion is heterogeneous, relation of psychic state to act is
universal ? 149, it may not apply to living beings and unique, and act is free, 235-240• pp. 222-240

conscious states, 150-154, idea of its universality depends
on confusion between concrete duration and abstract BIBLIOCRAPHY 241

time, 154-155: Psychological determinism, 155-163:

Bergson, Henri

1859 - 1941
Henri Louis Bergson (ejtsd: anri lui bergszon, Párizs, 1859. október 18. – Párizs, 1941. január 4.) francia filozófus.

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